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Abstract: 
Catastrophes and risks have had a great influence on the evolution of human development. 
We analyze behaviors in front of risks, then we consider some basic principles that have 
guided private and public behaviors. Managing risks has become a specialty for finance and 
insurance, but they are not the only institutions that allow to confront them. We conclude on 
an example of how public funds, private insurance and reinsurance companies can work 
together and use financial markets in order to cover financial risks due to seisms. 
 
JEL classification n°: G1, G22, H43, K32, N22,Q51, Q54 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The first time one talked about insuring seismic risk, it seemed like an earthquake in the 
world of Finance and Insurance! 
However, Swis-Re, the world’s biggest reinsurance company, and a firm that has managed 
financial instruments as well as insurance contracts for over a century, confronted the problem 
and recently arrived at practical solutions, notably for Mexico and the Mediterranean area. 
I’ll introduce the type of financial contracts proposed in the last section, but first I’ll go over 
the history of risks management, then differences between collective and private approaches 
in front of risks, before I review different forms of management policies and instruments. 
 
1. Risk management over history: Fighting the four enemies 
 
Let me indulge in my old 68’s culture to structure this first analysis on a then classical 
reference: The way of the pacific warrior by Carlos Castaneda, a strange teaching given to 
him by an old Mexican Indian sorcerer and related by the author as his Ph.D. thesis at the 
beginning of the 70’s. There are four enemies that an ordinary man has to face and overcome 
in order to become a warrior (i.e. one pretending to become a proper human being and not just 
a particular animal). 
The first one is fear, the second one is clarity (enlightenment, knowledge), the third one is 
power (wisdom) and the last one, the one that one can’t completely vanquish, is old age, or 
the evidence of death.  
I think these four steps may help us to understand how risk has been approached during 
human history, as well as in each of our individual lives.  
 
1.1 Facing risks 
                                                 
# Under the title: “Managing financial risks due to seisms (Gestion financière des risques provoqués par les 
séismes)”, this paper was first prepared for: “Provence’s 2009” - Seismic risk in regions of moderate seismicity: 
from hazard to vulnerability - what did we learn since the 1909 Lambesc earthquake? Aix en Provence, les 6, 7 
et 8 Juillet 2009. 
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Sicknesses, wild predators, harmful plants, geophysical phenomenon: e.g. earthquakes, are 
inspiring fear. How did and how do humans face it? 
 
1.1.1 Learning: Gods are the names given to some dangers in order to make them familiar, 
magical and religious practices helped to face fears. Observing the regularity of 
phenomenon, places where they took place, cause-effects, memories of actions that 
worked … all of these helped to give explanations and to be more confident in front of 
the risks so as to try and confront them … and being less paralyzed by the fears they 
inspired. 
However not being paralyzed doesn’t mean that one can confront a danger if (s)he’s not 
strong or armed enough. 
 
1.1.2 Getting together: Sharing knowledge, strength or ruse when useful, and the damages 
after unfortunate outcomes. “L’union fait la force”! is the Belgian national devise.  
However, getting together can be damageable to the whole: if everybody is stroke dead, then 
no one can profit from experience. 
 
1.1.3 Spreading the risk: “Don’t put all your eggs in the same basket”! is a wise popular 
say. As far as individuals are concerned, this implies that people share risks, 
preferably if they’re little chance that everybody gets to face bad outcomes at the same 
time. At the social level, this say induces to specialize in risks: different groups will 
concentrate on some specific tasks, develop their know how about the risks at stake, 
but rely on social solidarity when their activity sector is stroked by bad luck or errors.   
  
All these facets of human groups and individual behaviors help to get enough confidence to 
overcome fear in front of risks. So one can learn how to behave in front of hazardous 
phenomenon and overcome their inconveniences and/or damages: that’s what leads to clarity 
(enlightenment). 
 
 
1.2 Taking risks 
 
Once fear is overcome, individuals and their societies can try and deal with risks that they 
perceive with clarity. 
 
1.2.1 Using knowledge: curing diseases, hunting and gaming animals, growing and selecting 
plants and animals for consumption, using geophysical resources: ores, streams, 
winds … 
1.2.2 Working together: clans, organizations, governments … 
 
1.2.3 Specializing in skills: hunters, cultivators, blacksmiths, carpenters, and other 
workmanships, organizers …  
However, in order to feel more strength from knowledge, and improve it, some part of it is 
better kept secret or shared only by initiates in unions, secret societies, magical or religious 
sects.  
 
Taking risks is a facet of human behaviors once fear is overcome, and it is the secret to its 
success in surviving as a species, using its special brain capacities.  
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However clarity has its downside effects: mainly that overconfidence due to knowledge and 
know-how can lead to take inconsiderate risks that can’t be managed. Individual and national 
experiences are full of examples of it. However, humans can learn how not to be blinded by 
their enlightenment and, instead, learn to earn power (wisdom). 
 
1.3 Managing risks 
 
Individuals can deal with many risks by themselves, but most will gain from the society they 
belong to (or more relevantly, the community they join, i.e, the society where they put their 
wealth, including knowledge, in common). Given that a society is formed of individuals 
sharing some culture, language, skills and wills, individual behaviors and preferences can’t be 
ignored, even though decisions are taken at a collective level. Once clarity has been 
overcome, power can be exercised in order to manage risks. 
 
1.3.1 Social management 
 
Certainly the first way of confronting risks was religion. A religion is founded on gods that 
were the name put on phenomena. Notice that what is still not understood today is often 
called supra natural, or spiritual, by opposition to phenomena that are better understood and 
then interpreted as “natural”. Religion keeps the knowledge under the supervision of priests 
that know how to obtain the god’s good will. Such a belief (creed, faith, whatever yields a 
feeling of certainty) is enough to reassure humans and make them firm enough to confront 
risks. Moreover, religions are organizations that have developed groups of support for victims 
of catastrophes in parallel with their purely religious activities. Generally, religions have been 
related to political power very narrowly, a chief or king being considered as crowned by a god 
or even considered as a god himself (Pharaoh, Cesar Augustus1). Nowadays, religions are 
replaced by sciences that explain risky phenomena. Scientific knowledge has no pretence to 
universality, but it is a base on which governments and social organizations rely in order to 
have political power. 
Political power in turn can impose regulations and laws that help to manage and confront 
risks. Examples of managing risks through social regulations are many: Limitations on 
hunting so as not to destroy games, irrigations works and sharing rules for agriculture, 
property codes, interdiction of risky products and activities, market regulations, derogatory 
insurance… 
Thus, reassured by political power, individuals or groups of them, according to hierarchies, 
can confront risks and undertake actions with a sense of power (with “gods on their side”). 
Obviously, as has been observed all over history until today, this feeling of power may lead to 
catastrophic decisions. 
 
1.3.2 Individual and social preferences and behaviors in front of risks 
 
Social organizations are necessary to manage risk but individuals are the ones that can and/or 
want to take risks. Some will take more than others, depending on several factors: 
Psychological, social, economical… Most individuals will enter into some ways of sharing 
risks or comparing their valuation of risks. Trades of commodities obtained by taking risks 
(hunting, fishing, planting etc.) give a social value to these risks. Moreover, once a monetary 
system is developed, financial contracts can be traded and give a direct value to the risks they 
represent. For instance, borrowing and lending, because it was made under strict rules and 
                                                 
1 Augustus comes from augurus, the priest that says what the gods want. 
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religious oath, was possible without default risk. Hence such contracts define a rate of return 
characterizing the price of time: non-usurer rate. This is a direct measure of a part of risk: 
Time. Another essential part of risk is Uncertainty. And indeed, in order to have some direct 
valuation of risks (including Time and Uncertainty), it has been necessary to develop the 
concept of “risk” itself. 
 
1.3.3. Risk: image of a reef  
 
Religion, as we saw, has had it good sides in order to reassure humans in front of risks, it has 
had its dark sides too:  
- Forbidding to research knowledge and understanding of phenomena has kept priests in 
a powerful social position, but left humanity in a poor state of understanding. 
- Because faith yields certainty, it has been hard for religious power to recognize that 
there were some uncertainties that could be understood without questioning faith in 
gods. Indeed, the word “uncertain” only appeared for the first time in the 15th century, 
when science was starting to exist independently of religion in Europe (but it took 
three more centuries to achieve this). 
The concept of risk has freed entrepreneurship.  In fact, this concept has been the 
founding stone of modern industrial development, even though it took nearly a thousand 
years to complete the social transformation at stake. 
The problem was that financial contracts could not be underwritten at a rate exceeding the 
non-usurer rate. The reason was that a usurer rate was considered as a bet on the gods (and 
in the 12th century in Europe and the Mediterranean area, one God: YHWH, the Lord, or 
Allah). A bet with God was considered as a blasphemy (i.e. implying death sentence 
under any political-religious system). But the non-usurer rate concerns what we call 
nowadays “riskless assets”, it is not adapted to finance a risky adventure, such as sea 
transportation of very valuable cargos. Indeed, in order to finance such an enterprise, one 
needs to recognize somehow that the cargo may be lost and the borrower unable to 
reimburse the lender. This is what the concept of risk, i.e. the “image of a reef” (rhizikon) 
in the contract, was designed to characterize. The fact that a certain amount of present 
money is transformed into an uncertain list of possible money amounts, is what risk is all 
about. Such a risky contract must have a rate of return that is above the non-usurer rate 
(the price of time): this is fixed by the risk premium (if it is paid ex-ante) or, more 
generally, the price of risk. 
As from then (12th century), finance could deal with uncertainty without violating 
religious rules, and it did develop as a means for individuals as well as groups of them to 
confront risks (expressed by contracts in monetary terms). 
Finance developed financial risky contracts, added to classical riskless ones, in order to 
help individuals or groups of them to take risks. The contract transfers some of the risk, 
expressed in monetary terms, from the entrepreneur to a financial institution. Moreover, 
individuals could easily write contracts between themselves to share and pool some risks: 
Securities, or society shares. When all these contracts became familiar enough, they could 
be traded between partners and later on organized markets. Financial markets yield a 
collective price of risk2. 
When probability theory was developed by Pascal and Huygens in the 17th century, and 
statistics were invented a century later, a particular kind of risk could be defined and dealt 
with: risks with weighted outcomes3. Furthermore, among such risks some have an 
                                                 
2 See Briys and de Varenne (2001) for an interesting history of risks and its modern developments. 
3 Unfortunately, such particular risky situations have become known as the sole “risks” during the 19th century, 
and all the others called uncertain situations (Knight, 1921). 
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interesting property: they are independent. Independence, even though it may be related to 
some independence between the causes of the risks, is a probabilistic property: two risks 
are independent, if the joint probability of their outcomes is the product (hence lower) of 
each outcome’s probability. Such very particular risks are the ones that have made 
possible to develop a specialization of finance: Insurance.  
Insurance is a strange institution: it buys risks with only negative outcomes (something 
that no one would do in general), and it has however a riskless portfolio of these risks! As 
a result the insurance company can manage its portfolio at a riskless rate. This comes from 
two properties of insurance contracts: mutualization (pooling) of the risks (i.e. one is not 
insured against his own risk but against his share of the pooled risks), and the law of large 
numbers (if the number of pooled independent risks becomes great enough, the pooled 
risk converges towards its certain mean value). The last result is however an approximate 
one and insurance companies have to re-insure themselves and/or hedge their positions 
with risky financial assets.  
 
1.4. The society of risk 
 
The feeling of power can be an enemy, it may lead to forget that not everything can be 
controlled, that human capacities are decreasing with age, that we shall die. Examples at 
the individual level are many but it is true also at the collective level. Nations, for 
instance, have abused of their power through colonial expansion. Concerning risks, the 
danger is to think it can be controlled even when scientific knowledge is insufficient, for 
instance. Then death, at the individual level, deadly damages and destructions at the 
collective level have to be faced. Consciousness of this deadly enemy, and responsible 
behavior to confront it is what we’ve seen arise in the industrial word during the 20th 
century: what Giddens (1990) called the society of risk. 
We’ll address this topic from another point of view in next section. 
 
2. Confronting catastrophe (seismic among others) risk : The three P principles 
 
Jurisprudence distinguishes three types of risky situations: Individual responsibility 
(Prudence), collective risk management (Prevention) and, lately, a collective approach to new 
risks (Precaution) (Ewald, 1996). 
 
2.1 Prudence 
 
Individuals in Lambesc 1909 had no idea that they lived on a hazardous site. Therefore, 
they couldn’t be held responsible to have been careless about anti-seismic construction 
standards that were already available.  
Could we say the same thing today? Assume your little boy spends the night at a friend of 
yours in Lambesc and gets injured because the building fell on him during an earthquake. 
Could you sue your friend for not having made his house seism-proofed? Would it be the 
same if instead of Lambesc your friend lived in San Francisco or Tokyo?  
I’ll leave the question open for discussion. Just note that your friend would have at least 
an insurance (derogatory) covering his civil responsibility attached to the one on his 
house’s damages. You may still want to punch his nose because your son is wounded, but 
at least the cost of curing him and some monetary compensations will be taken in charge. 
In case of an earthquake, the insurance company will be hedged by a national fund 
(CatNat in this case in France) in order to face a catastrophe risk that it cannot insure 
according to usual professional standards. 
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2.2 Prevention 
 
The same argument is valid about preventive actions: In 1909, there were no serious 
findings leading to expect an earthquake such as the one that stroke Lambesc. It is not the 
same nowadays because it did strike, and because we know more about tectonics. 
Prevention doesn’t mean in this case that there are ways to prevent or soften the effects of 
a new earthquake, nor that devices could be put up to confront it. It means that the 
experience is recorded, that information about it and on new knowledge are made 
available and, eventually, that some recommendations, if not obligations, are given to the 
public about seismic proofness and prudent attitudes. 
At least as far as public building and facilities are concerned, prevention means that 
everything should be done so as to make them safer, as is done in towns like SF or Tokyo 
where the risk is scientifically well known. Recent ill-built schools in China have led to 
indict officials for not having done the proper preventive actions before the last 
earthquake that devastated the country. 
However, prevention devices are costly and the question is: are they worth the cost, given 
such a tiny probability that an earthquake prevails? 
 
2.3 Precaution 
 
Actually, talking about “tiny probability” is misleading: We just don’t know what the 
probability is. Even though we know a lot of things about earthquakes, we are still in a 
situation of “scientific uncertainty” about when and with what magnitude an earthquake 
may hit Lambesc.  Furthermore, the statistics we have do not satisfy the conditions to 
estimate a probability from the sample4. 
Scientific uncertainty is one of the fundamental elements of the Precautionary Principle, a 
recent (end of the 80’s) principle that has been introduced into jurisprudence and at 
different levels in laws and regulations to address some of the “new risks”, i.e. risks that 
can’t be handled by conventional means.  
Scientific uncertainty is characterized by controversies at the scientific level. 
Controversies can be about the phenomenon (this is not the case for earthquakes but it is 
about climate change, for instance, and climate change may have some – controversial – 
influence on earthquakes), or they can be about the damage’s importance, or its date, and 
most of the time about assigning a probability of occurrence.   
Precaution is furthermore addressed to risks that may involve very high damages. This is 
the case of earthquakes and other natural catastrophes. Precaution is concerned with risks 
that may occur in an undetermined future, even though actions must be taken at present. 
And, last but not least, Precaution concerns risks that are faced collectively, and very 
often at a supra national level (where there is not always a regulating organization that can 
impose regulations). For, instance this is the case for new endemics and earthquakes. 
Notice however, that Prevention as well as Precaution are included at the individual 
Prudence level, but they must be enforced at the collective level first, at least as far as 
information and regulations are concerned. 
Precaution, even more than Prevention, opens the problem of figuring out the costs 
reasonably (socially) acceptable to spend now in order to be able to manage possible 
controversial damages in the future.  
                                                 
4 Conditions are spelled by the theory of statistical inference. Notably, exchangeability of the data: the order in 
which they are recorded should be irrelevant. This is not satisfied by earthquakes linked to tectonics. 
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Economics and Management have developed tools to calculate damages that are not 
priced by markets, this is still work in progress but some results have already been used 
by jurisprudence, notably in the US for the Alaska catastrophic oil nuisance of the Amoco 
Cadix’ wreck. Other work in progress concerns the adapted discount factors to use in 
order to compare future benefits (resp. losses) and precautionary actions costs.  
Because cash flows (and not a given lump sum at a predetermined term) are concerned, 
financial technology is called for and adapted to value managing methods.  
 
3 Managing risk instruments 
 
Managing risks (in financial terms) belongs to the savoir faire of Finance and of 
Insurance. But, as important, solidarity in confronting risks relies on national and mutual 
funds under the supervision of regulators and collective decision makers. Furthermore, 
Finance and Insurance that have been separated as two specialties since Insurance was 
created in the 18th century, have merged again at the very time when the Precautionary 
Principle emerged in collective consciousness, and for the same reasons. There are risks 
that conventional managing instruments and organizations are not adapted to manage. Re-
insurance companies, which always made the link between finance and insurance, have 
developed a kit of innovative instruments that are helpful and may be adapted outside 
their sphere of influence. These tools involve collective as well as individual 
organizations, a tricky mixture that has still to be enforced, and/or invented to serve the 
purpose of managing new risks.   
 
3.1 Risks and Finance 
 
After having dealt with lending and borrowing at fixed terms from the beginning of 
history (in what is now Irak and part of Iran), finance invented the notion of risk, i.e. 
contracts including possible losses. The first contracts were pretty complex; they were 
designed in an adaptive and personal way between the financer and the entrepreneur. 
Similar transactions are still common at the Lloyd’s of London, a special institution in 
which “names” underwrite contracts involving their personal liability. Insurance 
companies may write similar contracts in some circumstances (e.g. under requirement of a 
government for a national project such as nuclear technology or rocket launchings). 
However, over time, contracts have been simplified, standardized and, in some cases, 
made impersonal so that they could be traded to newcomers on competitive markets.  
For instance, company shares, which correspond to parts of the investment in a risky 
industry, are not anymore nominal and can be traded freely on organized as well as on 
“over the counter” (OTC) markets. Moreover, contracts have been analyzed and divided 
into particular parts that concentrate on a special aspect of the risk. For instance, securities 
are a share of the gains, not of losses; Futures are contracts fixing the future price of an 
exchange at a given date; Options are contracts that offer the possibility, but not the 
obligation, to buy or to sell another contract at a fixed price and at a fixed term. Options 
are more flexible tools than futures and forwards contracts that do not leave open the 
future choice of buying or selling. Portfolios of such contracts make it possible to 
replicate some particular cash flows adapted to hedge a given risk. The engineering of 
finance has been developed at the end of the last century, thanks to mathematical models 
helping to valuate these contracts … when the assumptions of the underlying model are 
satisfied! For instance, the securitization of insurance portfolio is a way to spread the risk, 
or sell it to investors that are interested by their high returns. Obviously, high returns 
correspond to high risk-premiums and hence to very risky assets. 
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Most of these instruments have been designed to manage market risks, however the same 
techniques have been employed recently to design instruments adapted to other risks, such 
as climate-linked risks, and some other catastrophe risks. 
 
3.2 Probabilities and Insurance 
 
Risks in Finance have not, in general, a known or uncontroversial, probability of 
occurrence. Indeed, risky contracts were invented 200 years before the notion of 
uncertainty allowed to separate religious faith from scientific knowledge, and then enable 
to develop probability calculus for chance games that became the mathematical 
foundation for statistics that was developed four centuries later. As from then, using 
statistics, frequency and average age of death, for instance, have been calculated and made 
possible to propose contracts based on the length of one’s life: life insurance. In fact, in 
spite of its name, life insurance is not a typical insurance contract: both sides face risks 
that have positive as well as negative outcomes. Conversely, what is very special about 
insurance contracts is that they are contracts with only gains on one side and only losses 
on the other side. The know how of insurers consists in learning the type of risks (risk 
profiles), the probabilities (figured out thanks to statistical frequencies) and check 
independence of their client’s risks in order for their risk portfolio to satisfy the two 
principles of insurance mentioned above in 1.3.3.  
This doesn’t necessarily excludes catastrophe risk if an insurance company can spread the 
risks between regions exposed independently to catastrophes. However, the problem of 
valuating probabilities of occurrence and average means can be deterring.  
When there is no non-controversial nor sufficiently reliable probabilities, none of the 
techniques of insurance apply: the premium can’t be fixed, the terms may be variable, the 
contracts themselves are not obvious to write if the list of possible outcomes is not 
commonly admitted. In fact, catastrophe risks belong to the type of risks dealt with in 
Finance, and not to the engineering of Insurance. However, there has always been a link 
between those two industries: Re-insurance. 
 
Probability calculus is founded on chance games, cards, dices (alea), etc., in which every outcome is 
given (or has) the same “chance” or “probability” or “evidence” of coming out. It has been extended in a 
mathematical theory, and (is nowadays a part of measure theory) to all kind of set of outcomes, together 
with “events” (i.e. subsets of outcomes) that are measured by a probability: and additive function of 
events to the interval (0, 1). This defines a probabilized set of states.  
Based on probability theory, statistics (series) of observations have been considered as the outcomes of 
something similar to a chance game, i.e. a probabilized set of states. A mathematical theory of statistics 
has been developed, it justifies estimations of probability parameters (means, variance, etc.) and allows to 
test some assumptions (independence, for instance). Statistics yields frequencies, i.e. numbers between 0 
and 1. These frequencies can define a probability. For instance, in chance games, frequencies justify that 
probability calculus is right. However, in most cases statistics are used for the outcomes of phenomena 
that have nothing in common with a chance game and for which probability calculus couldn’t be used. 
This is the case of any scientific law of the type: y = f(x) where the “cause” x, explains through a 
function, f, the effect y. In fact, observation doesn’t satisfy the proposed law, so one assumes the 
differences between the theoretical value f(xi) and the observed value yi is random. Then, assuming for 
instance that the yi’s are measured by a given probability law (Gauss-Laplace in general), the parameters 
of the law are estimated. For instance the mean value (that is called mathematical expectation and is not 
necessarily what people expect!). 
y = f(x) +ε where ε is a random variable,  is the expression of what is called “scientific certainty”. 
Conversely, if theories disagree on the function f, if controversies arise about the probability distribution 
or its estimation, then we are in a situation of scientific uncertainty. 
 
3.3 Re-insurance and managing instruments 
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Because the Law of Large Numbers only yields an approximation, an insurance portfolio is 
not riskless. There are other reasons: risk profiles are difficult to determine and subject to 
information asymmetries such as moral hazard (i.e. the fact that once insured an individual 
can take more risks than before (s)he was), independence is hard to check, etc. Besides, due to 
competition, insurance companies have had a tendency to accept insuring risks that weren’t 
“insurable”, at least given their knowledge. 
So, insurance companies have to manage some risks and they turn to a super organization: 
Re-insurance. The first idea is to insure insurance companies: mutualizing (pooling) their 
risks, diversifying away their specialties, making the pooled risk portfolios independent so 
that the principle of insurance can be used. This is not sufficient, though, so Re-insurance 
developed ways to manage the part of risk insurance companies wanted to hedge, by issuing 
financial contracts and dealing on financial markets to diversify these risks away. 
Furthermore, and that’s the part that concerns us here, they developed some particular 
contracts in order to address the problems of typically non-insurable risks.  
Besides private re-insurance companies, let us mention the important role played by the 
States, and/or other public organizations, to re-insure insurance companies (as well as other 
finance activities, e.g. banks) in case a specific systemic risk or a catastrophe occurs (insurer 
of the last resort). States can use their wealth, extracted from the people’s taxes, to hedge in 
last resort risks that insurance companies are unable to face in case some particular hazard 
strikes and would make them default. We’ll see later in section 4, how these organizations 
may be involved on a more efficient manner to deal with seismic and other catastrophe risks, 
when the know how developed by Re-insurance companies is not sufficient or may be 
improved by interactions. 
As an example, we shall refer to Swiss Re, the world biggest Re-insurance company, and it’s 
pioneering efforts to built contracts to hedge seismic risks in section 4. 
  
3.4 More organizations and innovative instruments 
 
Insurance, even sustained by reinsurance, cannot offer a solution to all risks of damage 
problems. Indeed, solidarity at a more general level than simple mutualization is necessary for 
most catastrophe risks and for new risks.  
 
Concerning catastrophe risks, most States have set up an organization of funds and some 
regulations in order to provide first aid, medical care and some monetary compensation to 
victims. Historically, as we have seen, that was the first type of organizations set up to help 
confronting risks. However, with the development of the insurance and the finance industries, 
a better understanding of the way to manage risks has developed. For instance, the problem 
known in insurance as “moral hazard”5 is typically at the source of mismanaged preventions 
and of abuses in the distribution of the social funds. Another knowledge obviously developed 
by insurance companies is their ability to valuate possible damages and, as far as data are 
available, their occurrence frequencies. This ability is difficult to achieve without bias by a 
public agency, submitted to lobbies and other political and social pressures. Furthermore, 
experts are costly and are not easily rewarded by a public fund in proportion with the money 
they would help to save. The two previous (extreme) know how developed by insurance 
companies have led public organizations to cooperate with them, in most developed countries. 
For example, in case an event occurs, public experts have to decide that it is a catastrophe. 
Then insurance companies compensate the insured according to their damage estimation, but 
                                                 
5 Moral hazard is the risk that someone wouldn’t have taken but could take when insured, thus changing his risk 
profile. 
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the public fund compensates in turn insurance companies for compensations above the non-
catastrophic damages. Other ways of dealing with catastrophic events are similar: cooperation 
between public agencies and private insurance companies helps both parties to manage this 
type of risks.  
In front of the increase of damages due to catastrophes, such a cooperation is felt as necessary 
by both parties. A bigger role is attributed to private insurance, for instance by subsidized 
incentives, derogatory insurance, prevention means and regulations that make insurable, risks 
that were not, etc. Conversely, private insurance companies and other financial institutions are 
sustained by public funds in case of difficulties they face, assuming they respected 
fundamental precautionary rules.  
 
New risks open another type of problem. Typically they cannot be insured because the 
phenomenon is not known and probabilities are controversial. Furthermore, damages may 
occur at unknown and very remote future dates, and often are of unknown magnitude. This is 
why the precautionary principle emerged and is, little by little, integrated in national and 
international regulations. At this level, cooperation between judiciary and political public 
decision makers, on the one side, insurance and other financial institutions, on the other side, 
is welcome. Private sectors can’t work without adapted regulations, besides, financial markets 
for new contracts have to be regulated so as to satisfy the assumptions of the theory that yield 
them their optimality properties. On the one hand, the public sector is less productive than the 
private sector, with regards to innovative instruments and developed valuation methods. On 
the other hand, academic research, mainly supported by the public sector, is more able than 
private research institutions to develop new theories and technologies6. The best example is 
given by the option pricing theory developed by academic research and then applied to open 
options markets in Chicago in 1973. Private investments need to be able to valuate real 
investments: Academic research developed a theory that was then applied by the private 
sector. Reciprocally, instruments based on this theory can now be used to value new risks that 
are similar, in essence, to real investments in innovative productions. Valuation is indeed a 
first step for developing managing organizations and define socially acceptable preventive 
and precautionary investments costs.  
The public sector has also some ability that the private sector misses, for instance calling for 
experts of all fields to study a problem. It uses this ability to develop propositions to the 
private sector and organize some ways to cooperate. On the other hand, it is up to the private 
sector to decide whether it is willing and able to propose solutions that may alleviate the costs 
on the public sector. Clearly this cooperation was necessary for Swiss-Re to propose new 
managing instruments: Seismic catastrophe bonds, to manage a particular catastrophe risk 
that, although not essentially new, has all the characteristics of what the precautionary 
principle is about. The same approach could be developed for new endemics, tsunamis and 
volcano’s eruptions among other “new risks”. 
 
4 Risk management perspectives: Turning the enemies into allies 
 
The main teaching of Castaneda’s writing (at least for me), is that enemies can be turned into 
allies. 
 
4.1 Fears is stressing but stress enhances intelligence and leads to clarity. 
 
                                                 
6 Insurance and financial institutions are aware of the necessity to develop research in these fields and they 
finance academic research through grants and chairs for students and professors. 
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Confronting risks, ruse and learning, science and control of some phenomenon are ways to 
deal with risks that ignorance would make just paralyzing. Thus fear can become an ally to 
confront risks. It’s because people are afraid that they will agree to cooperate, accept some 
regulation rules, contract insurance and other hedging contracts and save: all that may 
reassure them enough to take risks. 
 
4.2 Clarity can black out and lead to overconfidence, but it may develop power 
with reasonable confidence. 
  
The danger of clarity is enhanced when the public sector uses its knowledge to reassure 
individuals. For instance, there is a tendency to launch slogans of the type: “low speed (on the 
roads) = security”. Obviously, driving a car cannot be secure, even when it’s stopped! 
Because people think they are secure when they drive slowly, they are not anymore stressed 
by fear that used to make them careful, they drive more carelessly and then become 
dangerous.  
The role of the public sector is to give information, including the limits of the knowledge. 
Scientific certainty and statistical evidence are not “certain”, they always include some 
variability and what is true at the collective level, may not be true anymore at the individual 
level. For instance, it is not true that eating foie gras is provoking heart disease, but it is not 
true either that French people are immune of this danger. For one thing such “evidence” are 
based on statistical results that depend on the sample, and consequences of eating foie gras 
depend on the general diet and on personal characteristics.  
Only full available information can yield a potential power to decide what attitude to take in 
front of risks, whether at the individual or at the collective level: taking adapted health 
insurance, imposing general prevention rules, developing managing instruments that take into 
account the limits of knowledge (a financial hedging contract is different from an insurance 
contract). 
 
4.3 Power can lead to abuses, but abuses strike back and clarify the limits of 
power.  
 
The ultimate limit of power is that human life is limited, so that death has to be integrated into 
the use of power. But death of one is not the end of life, that’s why collective choice is 
important: take into account that some lives will be lost so that life, in general, is not 
menaced.  
Examples of power abuses are easy to find. For instance, recall the power of nuclear 
bureaucracy and misleading information. Nuclear plants include some seismic proofed 
construction. But not all plants are done in the same way and not all seismic magnitude can be 
integrated. As a consequence possible catastrophe should be integrated into the management, 
for instance insurance and re-insurance contracts, at least to be able to manage compensations 
in case a disaster occurs.  
Other examples are that of industrial countries dumping their risky products over 
underdeveloped ones, exporting polluting products in countries with less regulations and 
expose people to unacceptable pollutions, exhausting natural resources, ruining soils by 
industrial and non adapted agricultural methods, etc. Obviously some international 
organizations and regulations help to alleviate these abuses, but the result has often been 
terrible death tolls before anything has been done to limit powers. 
Again, financial responsibility is an easy way to impose limits to these abuses: If one exposes 
a people to some risks, one has to be able to compensate, at least, possible catastrophic 
outcomes. This has a cost, the cost in turn regulates greed. National and international 
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regulations impose limits to such costs and may develop markets to share them in an efficient 
ways (e.g. pollution rights). 
 
 
4.4 Death can’t be defeated, obviously, but knowing it and fighting its fatal 
outcome helps to develop courage, intelligence and new means to exercise 
power. 
 
Fatality can be turned around into an active say: “Help yourself and Heavens will help you” is 
an answer in the realm of religious certainty.  
In the scientific certainty societies (industrial societies until the end of the 20th century), 
prevention has been developed, as well as social security and private insurance contracts to 
confront and manage some risks collectively. 
Precaution is a new concept that renews the individual and social perception of risk in its 
general sense: something certain (present) is transformed into a list of possible outcomes in an 
unknown future. 
It emphasizes the necessary interaction between collective choices and private ones in order 
to address, confront and manage risks.  
Because decisions have to be taken now for consequences that will occur in the future, at least 
two components of the future have to be taken into account: Time and Uncertainty at each 
date. When probabilities of outcomes are known, future can be mathematically described as a 
stochastic process. When probabilities are not known, stochastic calculus can be used … but 
with precaution! Furthermore, relevant stochastic processes are not the same at a collective 
level (statistics on a population sample) and at the individual level (I’m not interested in the 
mean life time, but in my own when I make decisions that concern myself). For instance, if I 
were 30, I would consider to invest in seismic proofed construction if I built a house in 
Lambesc. But at 60 and given my health, such an investment would not be justified, unless I 
take into account my heirs. Then another problem arises: how do I figure out the future 
generations’ preferences? Specially for generations that are not yet born, whose preferences 
will depend on the then available knowledge and on societal changes.  
These problems have to be solved to make collective choice according to the precautionary 
principle. One of them is to choose the right interest rates measuring the cost of time7. The 
second one is to measure uncertainty. Without reliable probabilities, a way to respond is again 
to turn to finance and measure uncertainty by its “social” measure: the price of risk. But, in 
order to do this, we need financial instruments designed to fit the risks at stake, which are 
sufficiently understood and accepted to be traded on organized markets. An answer to this is 
the development of cat-bonds, specialized to particular catastrophes linked to climate, 
weather, and seisms. More could be developed for floods, tsunamis, volcano eruptions and the 
like, as well as for industrial risks that may be catastrophic (e.g. nuclear and chemical plants). 
 
 
5 An example of financial innovation to manage risks: the Swiss-Re seismic cat-bonds. 
 
Swis-Re has been able to develop specific instruments to help governments and local agencies 
to manage seismic risks. This is the result of a wide cooperation between the public and the 
private sector. The first example concerns risks in Mexico, and the second one a more general 
seismic risk for Mediterranean countries (but not France!). 
 
                                                 
7 See Heal and Chichilnisky (1998) for instance. 
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5.1 Public and private cooperation 
 
Catastrophes such as earthquakes can’t be confronted at the individual level. However, 
individual behaviors do count, that’s where Prudence is called for. But Prudence can be 
imposed by collective rules, public information, and encouraged by subsidies and/or 
compensations. Up to a certain point, prudent behaviors may induce banks to lend money for 
building, for example, even though the house may be destroyed by a seism. More typically, 
even though earthquakes belong to the category of non-insurable risks, insurance contracts 
can be designed, taking into account prudent attitudes guaranteed by public and insurance 
companies experts, once some collective preventive devices have been set up.  
Prevention is adapted to situations of scientific certainty, so all efforts are made to get hazards 
and the damage’s probability distribution under some acceptable level if possible. If all this is 
sufficiently reliable, then insurance contracts can be offered to individuals at justified risk 
premiums.  
However, because risks can’t be reduced enough, it is still necessary that some public funds 
(e.g. Cat-Nat fund in France) warrant damages that are above the ones expected after 
preventive measures and regulations have been enforced. The problem is then to guarantee, or 
insure, or cover financially, this fund in case a catastrophe puts it in default. 
This is because we are in situations of scientific uncertainty, even though not in a situation of 
complete ignorance. The measurement of uncertain losses is left to the dealers of financial 
instruments, through the prices they set, in a way that satisfies both the demand (public funds, 
and banks and insurance companies linked to them) and the supply: financial investors 
looking for high return rates, disconnected from financial markets volatility. 
 
 
5.2  Mexican Parametric Earthquake Catastrophe Bond 
 
In Mexico, the negotiations initiated between some States and the Federal Government on the 
one side and banks and insurance companies on the other side. The purpose was to obtain 
loans, and insurance for these loans that would make them manageable by both parties. First 
of all, physical hazards were to be studied with the precision that was needed for the financial 
side to consider the kind of contracts and adapted premiums. Once the physical data were 
sufficiently reliable for insurance and banks, the organization of some pooling or regional 
risks (in order to lower premiums) and some public funds system had to be developed. The 
public funds had to deal with insurance companies and be hedged by some financial 
instruments: notably specific cat-bonds.  
A cat-bond is a bond (in this case a portfolio of government bonds), but including a default 
possibility that is linked to the occurrence of a given catastrophe. The problem is to define an 
index that will measure this catastrophe and be related to the default it may induce. Several 
indexes can be used. In case of a bond from a private company, the index is generally a 
market index for shares (S&P 500, for example). In case of a government bond, it depends on 
the rate attributed to the State, for instance, lately, several European countries have been rated 
B instead of A. For the case of a cat-bond, the index must be related to the catastrophic losses 
that may induce the default of the public fund. In the case of cat-bond on seism risk for 
Mexico, the default has been related directly to the seism magnitude on the Richter scale. In 
fact, only one trigger point has been chosen: magnitude 8.0. But depending on the epicenter 
place relative to damages, the defaults have been measured according to expected losses. 
 
 
Magnitude 7.0 7.5 8.0 
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% bond loss inner zone 40 100 - 
% bond loss outer zone 20 60 100 
 
 
 
Hence, the returns of the bonds, according to their ratings that go from BB to B- can be fixed 
so as to represent the price of risks. For instance if the issuer has a portfolio of riskless 
government bonds at 5% interest rate, plus a public fund risky bond, the total interest rate can 
be, say: 5+4 = 9% where 4% is the risk premium paid by the public fund. Such working out 
the design of the bond has been done through cooperation between public fund managers, the 
central Bank of Mexico, local banks, insurance companies and Swis-Re for the re-insurance 
and financial engineering technology.  
 
Hedging catastrophe risks (from Kast and Lapied, 2006) 
Catastrophe-bonds, or cat-bonds for short, are the most famous among the hedging instruments. As we shall see, 
they have some features in common with bonds, justifying their appellation, but these assets can be contingent 
on three types of random variables: Whether a damage index (insured casualties), or indexes that are specific to 
particular insurance companies, or/and a parameter index based on (statistically measured) catastrophe 
characteristics. The choice between such indexes as a reference to define a cat-bond, requires to take two risks 
into account: Moral hazard, due to insured agents and/or insurance societies behaviours on the one hand. And, on 
the other hand, basis risks, due to the imperfect correlation between the insured risks and the insurance claims. 
Securities defined on an insurer's specific risk have no basis risk but make the investors to face likely moral 
hazards. Conversely, securities founded on industrial damage indexes, sometimes completely, eliminate moral 
hazards, but the hedger is running basis risks. 
Cat-bonds are issued whether to address specific risks, or for well delimited geographical zones, for a fixed time 
horizon in both cases. 
Cat-bonds are called this way because, indeed, they are bonds: i.e. tradable debts based on market exchange 
index such as the Euribor or the Libor, which is calculated in the London market in US $ or in UK £ or other 
currencies. Expiration dates are often between 3 and 10 years and these securities are contingent on conditions: 
If no catastrophes occurs, or more exactly if no damage claims are above the determined in advance level, 
investors perceive the due payments integrally. The returns on investments are above the Treasury Bonds ones 
(riskless), often by more than 300 points. On the contrary, if the claims exceed the fixed level, then coupons 
and/or the principals are reduced so as to reimburse the concerned insurance companies. 
Because of regulation and tax concerns, a specific offshore structure called a "Special Purpose Vehicule" (SPV) 
proceeds to the bonds' emission. The SPV offers a reinsurance contract to the insurance companies seeking for 
one, at a cost. The total costs' amount is invested into Treasury Bills at a riskless rate, for a part, and into a short 
term securities' portfolio, for the remaining part. The riskless rate investments are meant to warrant the pledge on 
the investors, the short term high risky rate portfolio aims at hedging potential reinsured damage claims. 
 
Catastrophe risks can also be hedged by so called "derivatives". The futures market is open on the CBOT since 
1992. From 1995 on, claims are based on a group of indexes given by an official organism: The Property Claims 
Services (PCS). There are nine of such index-based insured damage claims, which are estimated from enquiries 
among insurance societies and other available information sources. Such indexes are revised day by day, they are 
relevant to determined geographical zones and for fixed expiration dates (trimesters or years). One index 
concerns the US territory as a whole and five indexes are specialised in States that are running particular risks 
(California, Florida and Texas, notably).   
Call options on catastrophe exist, as well, they are called cat-options: In exchange of a subscription that is paid 
in advance (premium), options give the right, but not the obligation, to buy the PCS index at a fixed in advance 
price (exercise price) at a fixed expiration date. Only call options are traded on the CBOT. 
Cat-spreads can be found. A spread is a combination of buying a call for a given exercise price and selling 
another one for a different exercise price, both calls with the same expiration date. Buying a cat-spread is a way 
to hedge an insurer's portfolio of claims, as an alternative to buying traditional insurance with deductible or stop-
loss insurance contracts. 
 
Comparisons between the different types of instruments can be based on: transaction costs, market liquidity and 
moral hazards. 
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- Cat-options can be traded at little cost (bid-ask spreads). Conversely, cat-bonds incur important 
transaction costs due to the organisational complexity and to the analysis of the underlying risk. 
- Markets for cat-options are bound to be easily cleared because of the participants' anonymity and if 
claims have a standardised form. Up to now however, the cat-bond market is not very active and trades 
can take time to be cleared due to a lack of agreements on some standard forms for contingencies. 
- The main advantage of cat-bonds over cat-options is that the basis risk that an investor is facing is much 
lower. 
 
Seen from the insurer's point of view, the basis risk value is a fundamental argument in favour of bonds.  
On the other side of the market, investors are mainly interested by claims contingent on catastrophes because 
they offer an alternative to traditional securities for diversifying their portfolios. Researches have shown that the 
returns of securities contingent on catastrophes have zero, or close to zero, correlation with other major 
traditional assets such that stocks and bonds. Estimates of the assets' returns correlations in the US are given in 
the following tableau. 
 
 Cat-bonds S&P 500 Treasury Bills 
Cat-bonds - - - 
S&P 5000 – 0.13 - - 
Treasury Bills – 0.07 0.40 - 
Cat-bonds (Source: Froot, Murphy, Stern and Usher (1995): "The emerging asset class: Insurance risk", Special 
report from Guy Carpenter and Company, Inc. 
 
This new class of securities attractiveness can also be measured by the Sharpe ratio between excess return with 
respect to the riskless rate and the risk's standard error.  
 
5.3 Swiss-Re cat-bonds for Mediterranean seisms 
 
On June 1st 2007, Swiss-Re obtained US$ 100 Million protection against earthquake risk in 
Turkey, Greece, Israel, Portugal and Cyprus. 
The problem has been solved on a very similar basis than the one of Mexico, however it was 
complicated by the references to different countries, regulations and hazards. The special 
sponsor vehicle to issue the cat-bonds, is MedQuake ltd. The real issuer is Swiss-Re with a 
retrocession agreement between the two companies. MedQuake issued notes that cover severe 
earthquake risk (measured by a parametric trigger) in the countries at stake, from May 2007 to 
May 2010. There were two classes of issues, with different ratings (depending on two 
different risky parts in the portfolio of the issuer) for the same redemption date (June 2010). 
 
 
Class Rating Size in M US$ Coupon (spread in basis 
points to LIBOR 3month 
rate) 
A BB- 50 355 
B B 50 510 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Is it wise to conclude on such an open subject? There is considerable work in progress in the 
economic and financial fields. They address several problems. The first and most difficult one 
is to value damages that are not marketed, i.e. with no direct market price. The way to do with 
environmental damages for instance, is to inquire among a relevant sample of concerned 
individuals about their willingness to pay (resp. their willingness to accept) for prevention or 
precaution devices (resp. for compensations). This incurs large costs for inquiries and for 
econometrical treatment of data. It necessitates also a lot of theoretical interdisciplinary work 
to get rid of many bias that weaken the results’ reliability. 
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Once damages are valued in money, a risk is described as a financial asset. It is not 
straightforward to value such a financial contract before it can be defined as a marketable 
asset. For instance, the techniques of finance are not helpful to value a cat-bond if it is based 
on a parametric trigger. However, as examples above have shown, this can be overlooked due 
to experience of both the financial institution (Swiss-Re in these cases) and the investors 
themselves.  
The valuations obtained are a good indicator for public managers to derive an overall value to 
the risks at stakes and obtain a basis to calculate and justify their investments in organizations, 
funds, and prevention or precautionary devices. Such costs are what can be integrated in a 
generalized cost-benefit analysis, which yields an indicator, and a criterion, which is not to be 
confused with a decision criteria, given the political, social and scientific uncertainty aspects.   
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